

# COMP541

## DEEP LEARNING

Lecture #06 – Understanding and Visualizing  
Convolutional Neural Networks




**KOÇ**  
**UNIVERSITY**

Aykut Erdem // Koç University // Fall 2025

# Previously on COMP541

- convolution layer
- pooling layer
- revolution of depth
- design guidelines
- residual connections
- semantic segmentation networks
- addressing other tasks



# Lecture Overview

- more on transfer learning
- visualizing neuron activations
- visualizing class activations
- pre-images
- adversarial examples
- adversarial training

**Disclaimer:** Much of the material and slides for this lecture were borrowed from

—Andrea Vedaldi’s tutorial on Understanding Visual Representations

—Wojciech Samek’s talk on Towards explainable Deep Learning


—Efstratios Gavves and Max Willing’s UvA deep learning class

—Fei-Fei Li, Justin Johnson and Serana Yeung’s CS231n class

—Ian Goodfellow’s talk on Adversarial Examples and Adversarial Training


—Justin Johnson’s EECS 498/598 class

# Image Representations



- An **encoder** maps the data into a **vectorial representation**
- Facilitate labelling of images, text, sound, videos, ...

# Modern Convolutional Nets




Excellent **performance** in most image understanding tasks

Learn a sequence of **general-purpose representations**

Millions of parameters learned from data

The “**meaning**” of the representation is unclear

# Modern Convolutional Nets













Excellent **performance** in most tasks, but the **meaning** of the representation is unclear

Learn a sequence of **general-purpose representations**

# Transfer Learning with Deep Networks

# Invariance and Covariance




Layer 1


Layer 7

Probability Score


# Filter Invariance and Equivariance




(a) Lighting




(c) Object color




(b) Scale




(d) Background color




(a) Car, pool5




(c) Car, fc6




(e) Car, fc7



(b) Chair, pool5



(d) Chair, fc6




(f) Chair, fc7

- Filters learn how different variances affect appearance
- Different layers and different hierarchies focus on different transformations
- For different objects filters reproduce different behaviors


		pool5	fc6	fc7
Viewpoint	Places	26.8 %	21.4 %	17.8 %
		8.5	7.0	5.9
	AlexNet	26.4 %	19.4 %	15.6 %
		8.3	7.2	6.0
Style	VGG	21.2 %	16.4 %	12.3 %
		10.0	7.7	6.2
	Places	26.8 %	39.1 %	49.4 %
		136.3	105.5	54.6
$\Delta^L$	AlexNet	28.2 %	40.3 %	49.4 %
		121.1	125.5	96.7
	VGG	26.4 %	44.3 %	56.2 %
		181.9	136.3	94.2
$\Delta^L$	Places	46.8 %	39.5 %	32.9 %
	AlexNet	45.0 %	40.3 %	35.0 %
	VGG	52.4 %	39.3 %	31.5 %

# Filter Invariance and Equivariance



# Pre-training and Transfer Learning

[Evaluations in A. S. Razavian, 2014, Chatfield et al., 2014]



## CNN as universal representations


- First several layers in most CNNs are generic
- They can be reused when training data is comparatively scarce.

## Application

- Pre-train on ImageNet classification 1M images
- Cut at some deep conv or FC layer to get features

# Transfer Learning

Deep representations are generic



- A general-purpose deep encoder is obtained by chopping off the last layers of a CNN trained on a large dataset.

# Transfer Learning with CNNs

- Keep layers 1-7 of our ImageNet-trained model fixed
- Train a new softmax classifier on top using the training images of the new dataset.



1. Train on Imagenet



2. Small dataset: feature extractor

Freeze these

Train this



3. Medium dataset: finetuning

more data = retrain more of the network (or all of it)


Freeze these

tip: use only  $\sim 1/10$ th of the original learning rate in finetuning top layer, and  $\sim 1/100$ th on intermediate layers

Train this

# CNNs as Filter Banks

Deep representations used as local features




- In R-CNN and similar models, the most important shared component are the convolutional features.

# Interpretability


# Dimensions of Interpretation

Different dimensions  
of “interpretability”




# Dimensions of Interpretation

Different dimensions  
of “interpretability”



**prediction**

“Explain why a certain pattern  $x$  has been classified in a certain way  $f(x)$ .”




# Dimensions of Interpretation

Different dimensions  
of “interpretability”

data

**prediction**

“Explain why a certain pattern  $x$  has been classified in a certain way  $f(x)$ .”



**model**

“What would a pattern belonging to a certain category typically look like according to the model.”





# Why Interpretability?


## 1) Verify that classifier works as expected

Wrong decisions can be costly and dangerous

“Autonomous car crashes,  
because it wrongly recognizes ...”




“AI medical diagnosis system  
misclassifies patient’s disease ...”




# Why Interpretability?

## 2) Improve classifier




Standard ML



*Generalization error*

Interpretable ML



*Generalization error + human experience*


# Why Interpretability?

## 3) Learn from the learning machine

“It's not a human move. I've never seen a human play this move.” (Fan Hui)



Old promise:  
“Learn about the human brain.”





# Why Interpretability?

## 5) Compliance to legislation


European Union's new General Data Protection Regulation  $\longrightarrow$  "right to explanation"

Retain human decision in order to assign responsibility.


"With interpretability we can ensure that ML models work in compliance to proposed legislation."

# Dimensions of Interpretation

model analysis




Find the input pattern that maximizes class probability.



Find the most likely input pattern for a given class.


decision analysis



Explain individual prediction.



# Dimensions of Interpretation

- Finding a prototype:



Question: How does a "motorbike" typically look like

- Individual explanation:




Question: Why is this example classified as motorbike?

# Some Approaches

- Visualize patches that maximally activate neurons
- Visualize the weights
- Visualize the representation space (e.g. with t-SNE)
- Occlusion experiments
- Human experiment comparisons
- Deconv approaches (single backward pass)
- Optimization over image approaches (optimization)


# Visualize patches that maximally activate neurons

one-stream AlexNet





**Figure 4: Top regions for six pool<sub>5</sub> units.** Receptive fields and activation values are drawn in white. Some units are aligned to concepts, such as people (row 1) or text (4). Other units capture texture and material properties, such as dot arrays (2) and specular reflections (6).


Rich feature hierarchies for accurate object detection and semantic segmentation [Girshick, Donahue, Darrell, Malik]




# Visualize the filters/kernels (raw weights)



only interpretable on the first layer :(



# Visualize the filters/kernels (raw weights)




AlexNet:  
64 x 3 x 11 x 11




ResNet-18:  
64 x 3 x 7 x 7



ResNet-101:  
64 x 3 x 7 x 7



DenseNet-121:  
64 x 3 x 7 x 7



Krizhevsky, "One weird trick for parallelizing convolutional neural networks", arXiv 2014  
He et al, "Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition", CVPR 2016  
Huang et al, "Densely Connected Convolutional Networks", CVPR 2017

# Visualize the filters/kernels (raw weights)

Weights:  


layer 1 weights

Weights:  


layer 2 weights

Weights:  


layer 3 weights

you can still do it for higher layers, it's just not that interesting


(these are taken from ConvNetJS CIFAR-10 demo)

# Visualizing the representation

fc7  
layer


4096-dimensional “code” for an image  
(layer immediately before the classifier)

can collect the code for many images





# Last Layer: Nearest Neighbors

Recall: Nearest neighbors in pixel space



Test image L2 Nearest neighbors in feature space




# Visualizing the representation

## t-SNE visualization

[van der Maaten & Hinton]


- Embed high-dimensional points so that locally, pairwise distances are conserved
- i.e. similar things end up in similar places. dissimilar things end up wherever
- **Right:** Example embedding of MNIST digits (0-9) in 2D



# t-SNE visualization:



- two images are placed nearby if their CNN codes are close. See more:

<http://cs.stanford.edu/people/karpathy/cnnembed/>




t-SNE


visualization:



# Visualize patches that maximally activate neurons




- Pick a layer and a channel; e.g. conv5 is 128 x 13 x 13, pick channel 17/128
- Run many images through the network, record values of chosen channel
- Visualize image patches that correspond to maximal activations



# Occlusion experiments

[Zeiler & Fergus 2013]



(d) Classifier, probability of correct class




(as a function of the position of the square of zeros in the original image)




# Occlusion experiments

[Zeiler & Fergus 2013]


Mask part of the image before feeding to CNN, draw heatmap of probability at each mask location



African elephant, *Loxodonta africana*




go-kart



Zeiler and Fergus, "Visualizing and Understanding Convolutional Networks", ECCV 2014

# Class-specific image saliency


How to tell which pixels matter for classification?



Dog


# Class-specific image saliency

How to tell which pixels matter for classification?



Dog

Compute gradient of (unnormalized) class score with respect to image pixels, take absolute value and max over RGB channels



# Class-specific image saliency

- Given the “monkey” class, what are the most “monkey-ish” parts in my image?
- Approximate  $S_c$  around an initial point  $I_0$  with the first order Taylor expansion


$$S_c(I)|_{I_0} \approx w^T I + b, \text{ where } w = \frac{\partial S_c}{\partial I}|_{I_0}$$

from backpropagation

- Solution is locally optimal



# Examples




# Examples




# Saliency Maps: Segmentation without Supervision

Use GrabCut  
on saliency map




# Intermediate Features via (guided) backprop



Pick a single intermediate neuron, e.g. one value in  $128 \times 13 \times 13$  conv5 feature map

Compute gradient of neuron value with respect to image pixels

# Intermediate Features via (guided) backprop



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Compute gradient of neuron value with respect to image pixels

b)

Forward pass

1	-1	5
2	-5	-7
-3	2	4

→

1	0	5
2	0	0
0	2	4

Backward pass:  
backpropagation

-2	0	-1
6	0	0
0	-1	3

←

-2	3	-1
6	-3	1
2	-1	3

Backward pass:  
"deconvnet"

0	3	0
6	0	1
2	0	3

←

-2	3	-1
6	-3	1
2	-1	3

Backward pass:  
*guided*  
*backpropagation*

0	0	0
6	0	0
0	0	3

←

-2	3	-1
6	-3	1
2	-1	3

Images come out nicer if you only backprop positive gradients through each ReLU (guided backprop)

# Intermediate Features via (guided) backprop




Maximally activating patches  
(Each row is a different neuron)



Guided Backprop

# Intermediate Features via (guided) backprop




Maximally activating patches  
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


Guided Backprop


# Visualizing arbitrary neurons along the way to the top...




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
# Visualizing arbitrary neurons along the way to the top...



# Class Activation Mapping (CAM)




# Class Activation Mapping (CAM)




$$F_k = \frac{1}{HW} \sum_{h,w} f_{h,w,k}$$

# Class Activation Mapping (CAM)




$$F_k = \frac{1}{HW} \sum_{h,w} f_{h,w,k} \quad S_c = \sum_k w_{k,c} F_k$$

# Class Activation Mapping (CAM)




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
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
$$= \frac{1}{HW} \sum_{h,w} \sum_k w_{k,c} f_{h,w,k}$$

Class Activation Maps:


$$M \in \mathbb{R}^{C,H,W}$$

$$M_{c,h,w} = \sum_k w_{k,c} f_{h,w,k}$$

# Class Activation Mapping (CAM)




Class activation maps of top 5 predictions



Class activation maps for one object class

# Class Activation Mapping (CAM)

Problem: Can only apply to last conv layer



Class activation maps of top 5 predictions



Class activation maps for one object class

# Gradient-Weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM)

1. Pick any layer, with activations  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{H \times W \times K}$

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3. Global Average Pool the gradients to get weights  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^K$ :

$$\alpha_k = \frac{1}{HW} \sum_{h,w} \frac{\partial S_c}{\partial A_{h,w,k}}$$

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
3. Global Average Pool the gradients to get weights  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^K$ :

$$\alpha_k = \frac{1}{HW} \sum_{h,w} \frac{\partial S_c}{\partial A_{h,w,k}}$$

4. Compute activation map  $M^c \in \mathbb{R}^{H,W}$ :

$$M_{h,w}^c = \text{ReLU} \left( \sum_k \alpha_k A_{h,w,k} \right)$$

# Gradient-Weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM)




# Gradient-Weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM)




(a) Original Image




(b) Guided Backprop 'Cat'




(c) Grad-CAM 'Cat'



(d) Guided Grad-CAM 'Cat'



(e) Occlusion map for 'Cat'



(f) ResNet Grad-CAM 'Cat'




(g) Original Image




(h) Guided Backprop 'Dog'



(i) Grad-CAM 'Dog'



(j) Guided Grad-CAM 'Dog'



(k) Occlusion map for 'Dog'



(l) ResNet Grad-CAM 'Dog'

# Gradient-Weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM)

Can also be applied beyond classification models, e.g. image captioning

**Grad-CAM**



A group of people flying kites on a beach

**Grad-CAM**



A man is sitting at a table with a pizza

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

## **(Guided) backprop:**

Find the part of an image that a neuron responds to

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

## **(Guided) backprop:**

Find the part of an image that a neuron responds to

## **Gradient ascent:**

Generate a synthetic image that maximally activates a neuron

$$I^* = \arg \max_I f(I) + R(I)$$

Neuron value



Natural image regularizer

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

1. Initialize image to zeros

$$\arg \max_I S_c(I) - \lambda \|I\|_2^2$$

Score for class  $c$  (before Softmax)



Repeat:

2. Forward image to compute current scores
3. Backprop to get gradient of neuron value with respect to image pixels
4. Make a small update to the image

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

$$\arg \max_I S_c(I) - \lambda \|I\|_2^2$$

Simple regularizer: Penalize  
L2 norm of generated image

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

$$\arg \max_I S_c(I) - \lambda \|I\|_2^2$$

Simple regularizer: Penalize L2 norm of generated image



**dumbbell**




**cup**



**dalmatian**



**bell pepper**



**lemon**




**husky**


# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

$$\arg \max_I S_c(I) - \lambda \|I\|_2^2$$


Simple regularizer: Penalize L2 norm of generated image



washing machine



computer keyboard




kit fox



goose



ostrich



limousine

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

$$\arg \max_I S_c(I) - \lambda \|I\|_2^2$$

Better regularizer: Penalize L2 norm of image; also during optimization periodically

1. Gaussian blur image
2. Clip pixels with small values to 0
3. Clip pixels with small gradients to 0

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent


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
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
Flamingo



Pelican



Ground Beetle




Indian Cobra

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

$$\arg \max_I S_c(I) - \lambda \|I\|_2^2$$


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


Hartebeest

Billiard Table




Station Wagon



Black Swan

# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent


Use the same approach to visualize intermediate features



# Network Comparison

“conv5”  
features


AlexNet



VGG-M



VGG-VD



# Deep Visualization Toolbox

[yosinski.com/deepvis](http://yosinski.com/deepvis)

#deepvis



Jason Yosinski



Jeff Clune



Anh Nguyen



Thomas Fuchs




Hod Lipson




# Activation Maximization

- Look for an image that maximally activates a **specific feature component**

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}} -\langle \mathbf{e}_k, \Phi(\mathbf{x}) \rangle + R_{TV}(\mathbf{x}) + R_{\alpha}(\mathbf{x})$$

















# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

Adding “multi-faceted” visualization gives even nicer results:  
(Plus more careful regularization, center-bias)

Reconstructions of multiple feature types (facets) recognized  
by the same “grocery store” neuron




Corresponding example training set images recognized  
by the same neuron as in the "grocery store" class




# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent



# Understanding the Model: Pre-Images



# Understanding the Model: Pre-Images



- The representation is not injective
- The reconstruction ambiguity **provides useful information about the representation**


# Finding a Pre-Image

A simple yet general and effective method

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}} \|\Phi(\mathbf{x}) - \Phi_0\|_2^2$$



Image



Representation


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
$$\min_{\mathbf{x}} \|\Phi(\mathbf{x}) - \Phi_0\|_2^2$$




Image



Representation



Reconstruction



Pre-Image


- Start from random noise
- Optimize using stochastic gradient descent

# Finding a Pre-Image

A simple yet general and effective method

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}} \|\Phi(\mathbf{x}) - \Phi_0\|_2^2$$

**No** prior




# Finding a Pre-Image

A simple yet general and effective method

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}} \|\Phi(\mathbf{x}) - \Phi_0\|_2^2 + R_{TV}(\mathbf{x})$$


**No** prior



TV-norm  $\beta = 1$




TV-norm  $\beta = 2$



# Inverting a Deep CNN

AlexNet [Krizhevsky et al. 2012]



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN



Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image




# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original  
Image



# Inverting a Deep CNN




Original Image





Multiple reconstructions. Images in quadrants all “look” the same to the CNN (same code)



# Inverting Visual Representations with Convolutional Networks [Dosovitskiy and Brox2016]

Minimize mean squared error:


$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x}, \phi} \|\mathbf{x} - f(\phi)\|^2$$

Pre-image as the conditional expectation:

$$\hat{f}(\phi_0) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x}} [\mathbf{x} | \phi = \phi_0],$$

Given a training set of images and their features, learn weights of a deconv network:

$$\hat{\mathbf{w}} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{w}} \sum_i \|\mathbf{x}_i - f(\phi_i, \mathbf{w})\|_2^2.$$



# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent

Employs auto-encoder and generative adversarial network components



volcano






redshank

ant

monastery



volcano



# Visualizing CNN Features: Gradient Ascent



# Caricaturization

[Google Inceptionism 2015, Mahendran et al. 2015]

- Emphasize patterns that are detected by a certain representation

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}} -\langle \Phi(\mathbf{x}_0), \Phi(\mathbf{x}) \rangle + R_{TV}(\mathbf{x}) + R_{\alpha}(\mathbf{x})$$

- Key differences:
  - The starting point **is** the image  $\mathbf{x}_0$
  - particular configurations of features are emphasized, not individual features

# Results (VGG-M)

input






conv2



conv3



conv4



# Results (VGG-M)

conv5









fc6



fc7



fc8



# Interlude: Neural Art

- Surprisingly, the filters learned by discriminative neural networks capture well the “style” of an image.

This can be used to transfer the style of an image (e.g. a painting) to any other.

## Optimization based

- L. A. Gatys, A. S. Ecker, and M. Bethge. Texture synthesis and the controlled generation of natural stimuli using convolutional neural networks. In Proc. NIPS, 2015.


## Feed-forward neural network equivalents

- D. Ulyanov, V. Lebedev, A. Vedaldi, and V. Lempitsky. Texture networks: Feed-forward synthesis of textures and stylized images. Proc. ICML, 2016.
- J. Johnson, A. Alahi, and L. Fei-Fei. Perceptual losses for real-time style transfer and super-resolution. In Proc. ECCV, 2016.

# Generation by Moment Matching


## Moment matching

- Content statistics: same as inversion
- Style statistics: cross-channel correlations



$$\mathbf{x}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}} E(\mathbf{x}; \mathbf{x}_{content}, \mathbf{x}_{style})$$







Vincci



Vinci




Vinci




Vinci



Vinci



Vinci



Vinci



Vinci



Vinci

# Artistic style transfer for videos

Manuel Ruder  
Alexey Dosovitskiy  
Thomas Brox

University of Freiburg  
Chair of Pattern Recognition and Image Processing

# Start Term Course Evaluation

- November 6 through November 17 (until midnight) 2024

**1- Download "Koc University" mobile application.**

For iOS (iPhone/iPad-App Store): [Koç University on the App Store \(apple.com\)](https://apple.com)

For Android (Play Store): [Koç University - Apps on Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kocuniversity)

2 - Select Course Evaluation.

3 - View the list of courses for which you are registered for Fall 2024.

4 - Choose your courses one by one.

5 - Answer the questions.

6. Click **Submit** button.


Finally, please accept our thanks in advance for your support and cooperation in this important process.

Regards,

Registrar's & Student Affairs Directorate

# Fooling Deep Networks

# Since 2013, deep neural networks have matched human performance at...



(Szegedy et al, 2014)

...recognizing objects and faces....




(Taigmen et al, 2013)



(Goodfellow et al, 2013)

...solving CAPTCHAS and reading addresses...



(Goodfellow et al, 2013)

and other tasks...

# Fooling images

- What if we follow a similar procedure but with a different goal
- Generate “visually random” images
  - Images that make a lot of sense to a CNN but no sense at all to us
- Or, assume we make very small changes to a picture (invisible to the naked eye)
  - Is a CNN always invariant to these changes?
  - Or could it be fooled?

# Adversarial Examples

1. Start from an arbitrary image
2. Pick an arbitrary category
3. Modify the image (via gradient ascent) to maximize the class score
4. Stop when the network is fooled

# Adversarial Examples

African elephant




koala



Difference



10x Difference



schooner




iPod



Difference



10x Difference



# Adversarial Attacks and Defense

**Adversarial Attack:** Method for generating adversarial examples for a network

**Adversarial Defense:** Change to network architecture, training, etc. that make it harder to attack


# Adversarial Attacks and Defense

**Adversarial Attack:** Method for generating adversarial examples for a network — **Easy**

**Adversarial Defense:** Change to network architecture, training, etc. that make it harder to attack — **Hard**

# Adversarial Attacks

**White-box attack:** We have access to the network architecture and weights. Can get outputs, gradients for arbitrary input images.




$P(\text{elephant}) = 0.9$   
 $P(\text{cat}) = 0.05$

...


# Adversarial Attacks

**White-box attack:** We have access to the network architecture and weights. Can get outputs, gradients for arbitrary input images.



$p(\text{elephant}) = 0.9$   
 $p(\text{cat}) = 0.05$   
...

**Black-box attack:** We don't know network architecture or weights; can only get network predictions for arbitrary input images



$p(\text{elephant}) = 0.9$   
 $p(\text{cat}) = 0.05$   
...

# Adversarial Examples

African elephant




koala



Difference



10x Difference







Huge area of research!

Security concern for networks deployed in the wild

# Intriguing properties of neural networks



[Szegedy et al., 2013]



correct

+distort

ostrich



correct


+distort

ostrich

# Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images

[Nguyen, Yosinski, Clune, 2014]


>99.6%  
confidences



# Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images

[Nguyen, Yosinski, Clune, 2014]


>99.6%  
confidences



# Not just for neural nets

- Linear models
  - Logistic regression
  - Softmax regression
  - SVMs
- Decision trees
- Nearest neighbors


# Attacking a Linear Model



- Softmax regression
- Turning "9" into other digits
- Yellow boxes denote misclassifications

# Let's fool a binary linear classifier: (logistic regression)

$$P(y = 1 \mid x; w, b) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(w^T x + b)}} = \sigma(w^T x + b)$$



Since the probabilities of class 1 and 0 sum to one, the probability for class 0 is  $P(y = 0 \mid x; w, b) = 1 - P(y = 1 \mid x; w, b)$ . Hence, an example is classified as a positive example ( $y = 1$ ) if  $\sigma(w^T x + b) > 0.5$ , or equivalently if the score  $w^T x + b > 0$ .

# Let's fool a binary linear classifier:

<b>x</b>	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1	← input example
<b>w</b>	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1	← weights

$$P(y = 1 \mid x; w, b) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(w^T x + b)}} = \sigma(w^T x + b)$$

# Let's fool a binary linear classifier:

<b>x</b>	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1	← input example
<b>w</b>	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1	← weights

class 1 score = dot product:

$$= -2 + 1 + 3 + 2 + 2 - 2 + 1 - 4 - 5 + 1 = -3$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{probability of class 1 is } 1/(1+e^{(-(-3))}) = 0.0474$$

i.e. the classifier is **95%** certain that this is class 0 example.

$$P(y = 1 \mid x; w, b) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(w^T x + b)}} = \sigma(w^T x + b)$$

# Let's fool a binary linear classifier:

<b>x</b>	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1	← input example
<b>w</b>	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1	← weights
adversarial <b>x</b>	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	

class 1 score = dot product:

$$= -2 + 1 + 3 + 2 + 2 - 2 + 1 - 4 - 5 + 1 = -3$$

=> probability of class 1 is  $1/(1+e^{(-(-3))}) = 0.0474$

i.e. the classifier is **95%** certain that this is class 0 example.

$$P(y = 1 | x; w, b) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(w^T x + b)}} = \sigma(w^T x + b)$$

# Let's fool a binary linear classifier:

<b>x</b>	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1	←
<b>w</b>	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1	←
adversarial <b>x</b>	1.5	-1.5	3.5	-2.5	2.5	1.5	1.5	-3.5	4.5	1.5	

class 1 score before:

$$-2 + 1 + 3 + 2 + 2 - 2 + 1 - 4 - 5 + 1 = -3$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{probability of class 1 is } 1/(1+e^{(-(-3))}) = 0.0474$$

$$-1.5+1.5+3.5+2.5+2.5-1.5+1.5-3.5-4.5+1.5 = 2$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{probability of class 1 is now } 1/(1+e^{(-(-2))}) = 0.88$$

**i.e. we improved the class 1 probability from 5% to 88%**

$$P(y = 1 | x; w, b) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(w^T x + b)}} = \sigma(w^T x + b)$$

# Let's fool a binary linear classifier:

<b>x</b>	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1	←
<b>w</b>	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1	←
adversarial <b>x</b>	1.5	-1.5	3.5	-2.5	2.5	1.5	1.5	-3.5	4.5	1.5	

class 1 score before:

$$-2 + 1 + 3 + 2 + 2 - 2 + 1 - 4 - 5 + 1 = -3$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{probability of class 1 is } 1/(1+e^{(-(-3))}) = 0.0474$$

$$-1.5+1.5+3.5+2.5+2.5-1.5+1.5-3.5-4.5+1.5 = 2$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{probability of class 1 is now } 1/(1+e^{(-(-2))}) = 0.88$$


**i.e. we improved the class 1 probability from 5% to 88%**

This was only with 10 input dimensions. A 224x224 input image has 150,528.

(It's significantly easier with more numbers, need smaller nudge for each)

# Blog post: Breaking Linear Classifiers on ImageNet

Recall CIFAR-10 linear classifiers:




ImageNet classifiers:




<http://karpathy.github.io/2015/03/30/breaking-convnets/>

mix in a tiny bit of  
Goldfish classifier weights

0.9% bobsled




+




=

100.0% goldfish



**100% Goldfish**


1.0% kit fox



8.0% goldfish




1.0% kit fox



3.9% school bus




8.3% goldfish



12.5% daisy




# Adversarial Examples from Overfitting




Are these adversarial examples related to overfitting?

# Adversarial Examples from Excessive Linearity




# Modern deep nets are very piecewise linear


Rectified linear unit




Maxout



Carefully tuned sigmoid



LSTM



# The Fast Gradient Sign Method

$$J(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) \approx J(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) + (\tilde{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x})^\top \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} J(\mathbf{x}).$$

Maximize

$$J(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) + (\tilde{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x})^\top \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} J(\mathbf{x})$$

subject to

$$\|\tilde{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$$

$$\Rightarrow \tilde{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{x} + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} J(\mathbf{x})).$$

# Adversarial Examples



“panda”  
57.7% confidence

+ .007 ×



“nematode”  
8.2% confidence

=



“gibbon”  
99.3 % confidence



$$\mathbf{X}^{adv} = \mathbf{X} + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{X}} J(\mathbf{X}, y_{true}))$$

Score of label  $y_{true}$ , given input image  $\mathbf{X}$

# Adversarial Examples that Fool both Human and Computer Vision



Left: An image of a cat

Right: The same image after it has been adversarially perturbed to look like a dog

(Elsayed et al., 2018)

# Practical Attacks

- Fool real classifiers trained by remotely hosted API (MetaMind, Amazon, Google)
- Fool malware detector networks
- Display adversarial examples in the physical world and fool machine learning systems that perceive them through a camera

# Adversarial Examples in the Physical World



(a) Printout




(b) Photo of printout



(c) Cropped image


# Hypothetical Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles

Denial of service




Confusing object

Harm others



Adversarial input recognized as "open space on the road"

Harm self / passengers



Adversarial input recognized as "navigable road"

# Physical Adversarial Examples

- Physical adversarial examples against the YOLO detector
- Adversarial examples take the form of sticker perturbations that are applied to a real STOP sign



# Audio Adversarial Examples


- targeted audio adversarial examples on speech-to-text transcription neural networks




"without the dataset the article is useless"



"okay google browse to evil dot com"






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



× 0.001

=



"it was the best of times, it was the worst of times"




"it is a truth universally acknowledged that a single"

# Adversarial Examples for RL

Test-Time Execution

raw input



output action distribution

Test-Time Execution with  $\ell_\infty$ -norm FGSM Adversary

raw input



output action distribution

adversarial perturbation (unscaled)



$$\text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$$

adversarial input



output action distribution

# Failed defenses

Generative  
pretraining

Removing perturbation  
with an autoencoder

Adding noise  
at test time

Ensembles

Confidence-reducing  
perturbation at test time

Error correcting  
codes

Multiple glimpses

Weight decay

Double backprop

Adding noise  
at train time

Various  
non-linear units

Dropout

# Adversarial Training

Labeled as bird




Still has same label (bird)



Decrease  
probability  
of bird class

# Virtual Adversarial Training

Unlabeled; model guesses it's probably a bird, maybe a plane




New guess should match old guess (probably bird, maybe plane)



Adversarial perturbation intended to change the guess

# Training on Adversarial Examples



# Adversarial Training of other Models

- Linear models: SVM / linear regression cannot learn a step function, so adversarial training is less useful, very similar to weight decay
- k-NN: adversarial training is prone to overfitting.
- Takeaway: neural nets can actually become more secure than other models. Adversarially trained neural nets have the best empirical success rate on adversarial examples of any machine learning model.

**Next lecture:**  
Recurrent Neural Networks